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critical analysis of  the most prominent aspects of  the SSM.
KEYWORDS: European Banking Union – euro – Economic and Monetary Union – bank 
supervision – Single Supervisory Mechanism.
* Member of  the Centre of  Studies in EU Law (CEDU) of  the University of  Minho.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2018
68 Rui do Carmo
1. Context and pretext: the Euro debt crisis
The Euro debt crisis, a perfect storm of  unforeseen proportions that followed 
a global financial crisis,1 took over media attention during the last decade, and the 
responses designed to address it, in the context of  an EU unprepared to face its 
outcomes and implications,2 have given strength for further steps to be taken in order 
to deepen the European Monetary Union (EMU), a problematic affair in itself.3
This was the backdrop for the set up of  the European Banking Union (EBU), 
a fish out of  water originally submerged in a legal territory bounded by EU Treaty 
constraints that would predictably struggle to adjust to the political environment of  the 
last few years, and whose success will necessarily depend on its capacity to help stabilize 
the Euro area and prevent the reversal of  persistent and long lasting trends towards 
fragmentation and renationalization of  financial markets.
The sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area was, in fact, initially regarded as the 
dreadful milestone that could prompt closer fiscal integration in the EU and force 
the hand of  the EU institutions to sort out the shortcomings of  the EMU.4 What is 
more, growing public attention over the staggering numbers on debt also explains the 
unwillingness of  governments in fiscally rather strong EU Member States5 when it 
comes to confronting their electorates with into accepting the need for bolder steps 
towards a broader and deeper economic, fiscal and political integration of  the Euro 
area, that could be perceived as an unconditional bail out of  irresponsible foreigners, 
a view that has been prevalent amongst populist opposition parties. A pragmatic 
approach was therefore also perceived, at the EU level, as the most sensible option for 
the steps to be taken,6 acknowledging, however, the convoluted association between 
1 For a full chronology and description of  the early stages of  the global financial crisis, see the 79th 
Annual Report of  the Bank for International Settlements, Basel, 29 June 2009, accessed January 10, 
2018, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2009e0.pdf. 
2 For a critical analysis on this subject, see Rui do Carmo, “The early days of  the euro debt crisis revisited: 
historical, legal and institutional overview of  the role of  the ECB in the context of  an Economic and Monetary Union 
in mutation”, in UNIO EU Law Journal, CEDU - Centre of  Studies in European Union Law, vol. 1, 
nº. 1 (2015): 94-109; accessed January 10, 2018, available at http://www.unio.cedu.direito.uminho.
pt/Uploads/UNIO%201/The%20early%20days%20of%20the%20euro%20debt%20crisis%20
revisited_UNIO.pdf. 
3 For a full chronology and description of  the events regarding the set up of  the European Monetary 
Union see H. K. Scheller, The European Central Bank – History, Role and Functions (Frankfurt am Main: 
ECB edition, 2006) and H. Ungerer, A Concise History of  European Monetary Integration – From EPU to 
EMU (Westport: Quorum Books, 1997). 
4 See, for several pre sovereign solvency crisis analysis of  the pros and cons of  the addition of  a banking 
component to the EMU, Martin Čihák & Jörg Decressin, “The Case for a European Banking Charter”, Int. 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper nº. 173 (2007): 7-12; accessed January 10, 2018, available at http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07173.pdf; Nicolas Véron, “Is Europe Ready for a Major Banking 
Crisis?”, Bruegel Pol’Y Brief  nº 3 (2007): 4-6; accessed January 10, 2018, available at http://www.bruegel.
org/download/parent/234-is-europe-ready-for-a-major-banking-crisis/file/659-is-europe-ready-for-a-
major-banking-crisis-english/. 
5 Several Member States consistently exhibit debt to GDP ratios beyond the 90% threshold that was 
regarded as a peril to long term prosperity: for an influential, yet contested contribution, see Carmen 
Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, “Growth in A Time of  Debt”, 100 AM. Econ. Rev., Papers & Proc., 573 
(2010); and for an opposing view, see Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash & Robert Pollin, “Does High 
Public Debt Consistently Stiffle Economic Growth? A Critique of  Reinhart and Rogoff”, U. of  Mass. Amherst, 
Pol. Econ. Res. Inst., Working Paper nº. 322 (2013); accessed January 10, 2018, available at http://
www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_301-350/WP322.pdf. 
6 As an emblematic illustration  of  the referred mind set, see For an account of  the broader political 
agenda of  the European “four presidents” see Herman Van Rompuy, José Manuel Barroso, Jean 
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a successful banking union and a reinforced fiscal and political integration in the EU.7 
The reasoning behind such a mind set was that a European banking union, which 
would ensure an impartial and uniform implementation of  a stringent regulatory and 
supervisory framework for all Euro area banks could if  ultimately fulfilled, lead to a 
welcome outcome.8 However, even with thorough set of  demanding substantive rules 
for the governance of  banks’ operations and their risk taking behaviour, an effective 
and rigorously enforced supervisory and resolution regime along with common safety 
nets (i.e. a reliable deposit guarantee scheme and a clearly defined central bank lender of  
last resort obligations) could not do much to overcome the past mishaps, but should be 
apt to make future crises less likely and limit their impact if  all elements of  the banking 
union deemed essential were to be ultimately introduced. A regulatory intervention9 
should constitute a step forward in creating a more resilient financial system and in 
recovering the lost confidence in the financial system’s stability as an indispensable 
foundation for sustainable growth in the long term.
Additionally, the banking union was explicitly set up as an instrument to “break 
the vicious cycle between banks and sovereigns”,10 since the potential for mutual reinforcement 
between financial and sovereign crises had already been acknowledged.11
2. Triggering progress towards the European Banking Union
As mentioned supra,12 a series of  specific events intertwined to give rise to the 
Claude Juncker & Mario Draghi, “Towards a genuine economic and monetary Union” (2012), 
accessed January 10, 2018, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf. 
7 See, particularly, Jean Pisani Ferry et al., “What Kind of  European Banking Union?”, Bruegel Pol’y 
Contribution nº. 12 (2012): 15-19, accessed January 10, 2018, available at http://www.bruegel.org/
download/parent/731-what-kind-of-european-banking-union/file/1595-what-kind-of-european-
banking-union/; Nicolas Véron, “Europe’s Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Long Journey Towards 




8 In agreement with this position see e.g. Rishi Goyal et al., “A Banking Union for the Euro Area”, Int’l 
Monetary Fund Staff  Discussion Note 13/01 (2013): 7-10, accessed January 10, 2018, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1301.pdf; for an opposite view, see Douglas C. 
Elliot, “Key Issues on European Banking Union: Trade Offs and Some Recommendations”, Brookings Global 
Econ. & Dev. Working Paper nº. 52 (2012): 45-46, accessed January 10, 2018, available at http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/11/european-banking-union-elliott/11-
european-banking-union-elliott.pdf. 
9 As a pro banking regulation and supervision position, see Sudipto Bhattachary, Arnoud W. A. Boot 
& Anjan V. Thakor, “The Economics of  Bank Regulation”, J. Money Credit Bank, 745 (1998); as a critical 
view of  stringent and complex regulation, see Jonathan R. Macey, “The death of  corporate reputation: how 
integrity has been destroyed on Wall Street” (2013): 254 259. 
10 In agreement with this position see e.g. Rishi Goyal et al., “A Banking Union for the Euro Area”, Int’l 
Monetary Fund Staff  Discussion Note 13/01 (2013): 7 10, accessed January 10, 2018, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1301.pdf; for an opposite view, see Douglas C. 
Elliot, “Key Issues on European Banking Union: Trade Offs and Some Recommendations”, Brookings Global 
Econ. & Dev. Working Paper nº. 52 (2012): 45-46, accessed January 10, 2018, available at http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/11/european-banking-union-elliott/11-
european-banking-union-elliott.pdf.
11 Press Release, European Council, Euro Area Summit Statement (June 29, 2012), accessed January 10, 
2018, available at http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf. 
12 Cf. supra notes 1 and 2. 
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crisis that pushed the setting up of  the EBU, namely the constrains that put the EMU 
under stress and the re fragmentation of  the Internal Market for financial services. 
Particularly, during the summer of  2012, widening of  return spreads for Euro area 
government bonds and incrementally diverging money and capital market rates 
across the Euro area mounted up to sovereign and private sector imbalances that 
were perceived as a sign of  the critical status of  the EMU,13 events that hindered the 
implementation of  a uniform monetary policy within the EMU, as, for instance, cuts 
in monetary policy rates had limited effect in certain Member States.14 Banks business’ 
costs were relatively dependant on their home Member State’s fiscal strength and the 
consequential credibility of  its backstops, therefore establishing a pro cyclical link 
between sovereign and private borrowing costs.15
The general loss of  confidence in the banking sector’s viability that brought 
Member States’ bail out capacity to the limelight could be attributed to that palpable 
loss of  a level playing field for the provision of  financial services in the Internal 
Market.16 Independently of  short term crisis management measures, the long term 
counterstrategy to rebuild trust in the stability of  financial institutions also required 
no less than effective prudential supervision and a functional resolution regime that 
would prevent future sudden rises of  risk concentrations befitting to put systemic 
stability at stake. In other words, centralization was required by the recent episodes 
in the Euro area only if  and where the alternatives were less effective.17
It seems intuitive, though that the increasingly transnational nature of  current 
banking should have a parallel in an equivalent supervisory architecture that 
minimizes negative cross border externalities.18 The build up of  dangerous risk 
concentrations in favourable periods could be limited by the lower susceptibility to 
national preferences, a broader information base, and cross country comparisons.19 A 
13 European Central Bank, Financial Integration in Europe (April, 2012): 17-28 and 31-35, accessed 
January 10, available at http://www.ecb.eu/pub/pdf/other/financialintegrationineurope201204en.pdf. 
14 For the ECB’s assessment, see European Central Bank, Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a Monetary 
Union, July Monthly Bulletin, 51 (2012), accessed January 10, available at http://www.ecb.eu/pub/
pdf/mobu/mb201207en.pdf; see, additionally, Jean Pisani Ferry and Guntram B. Wolff, “Propping Up 
Europe?”, Bruegel Pol’y Contribution nº. 7 (2012): 7-12, accessed January 10, available at http://www.
bruegel.org/download/parent/721-propping-up-europe/file/1572- propping-up-europe/. 
15 Goyal et al., 7, supra note 8. 
16 Chiara Angeloni and Guntram B. Wolff, “Are Banks Affected by their Holdings of  Government Debt?”, 
Bruegel Working Paper, 7 (2012), accessed January 10, available at http://www.bruegel.org/down-
load/parent/717-are-banks-affected-by-their-holdings-of-government-debt/file/1564-are-banks-
affected-by-their-holdings-of-government-debt/. 
17 Uwe H. Schneider, “Inconsistencies and un-solved Problems in the European Banking Union”, 24 EUR. J. 
BUS. L. (2013): 454. 
18 Goyal et al., 7, 8 and 14, supra note 8; specifically regarding crisis management, see Guido Ferrarini 
and Luigi Chiarella, “Common Supervision in the Eurozone: Strengths and Weaknesses”, Eur. Corp. Governance 
Inst. Law Working Paper nº. 223 (2013): 6-19, accessed January 10, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2309897; regarding an overview of  banks’ risk-taking behaviour under nationally fragmented 
supervision and resolution, see Dirk Schoenmaker, “Banking Supervision and Resolution – the European 
Dimension”, 6 L. and Fin. Markets Rev.,  52 (2012): 53 54.  
19 However, informational advantages of  a supranational supervisor only come up with regard to 
banks with sizable cross border operations, Pisani Ferry et al., 9, supra note 14. It is possible, though, 
that parallel behaviour and/or risk exposure of  many small and medium sized may pose systemic risks 
of  wider proportions, André Sapir, Martin Hellwig and Marco Pagano, “A contribution from the Chair 
and Vice Chairs of  the Advisory Scientific Committee to the discussion on the European Commission’s banking union 
proposals”, Reports of  the Scientific Advisory Committee, nº. 2 (October 2012): 3, accessed January 
10, available at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/Reports_ASC_2_1210.pdf?abc5e4da5bbc
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transnational perspective would counter desires to deplete foreign activities in order 
to stabilize the national banking system in periods of  crisis and would, therefore, 
prevent the (re ) fragmentation of  financial markets.20
Considering that a banking union, as a crisis response, has to be set up carefully 
with due regard to its long term implications for pan EU institutions, the desirability 
of  more centralization remained, however, a topic of  dispute among EU political 
actors. The breaking out of  the Spanish and Cypriot banking crises ended up being 
turning points that determined the epilogue of  that intransigence.
In fact, once the first rumours of  a private sector participation in the efforts 
to reduce the Greek sovereign debt load to sustainable proportions had undermined 
the trust in the viability of  the European banking sector in July 2011, the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) run a capital exercise to control the markets. Consequently, 
the overall need for its additional funds at the relevant Spanish banks was estimated at 
€26.17bn.21 Yet, the burst of  the bubble in the residential construction market in May 
2012 revealed that then nationalized Bankia S.A., the nation’s largest mortgage lender, 
needed to be bailed out with a capital up to €19 bn, after the Spanish government had 
converted an earlier €4.5 bn rescue loan into voting stock.22 Dynamic provisioning, 
or “cookie jar accounting”, i.e., obscuring accounting practices,23 and dubious pre 
insolvency debt restructurings (liquidity management exercises),24 that were later 
revealed as having at least been tolerated by the competent supervisor (Bank of  
Spain), had helped to disguise a problem that festered for years and eventually 
needed an overall reorganization of  the problematic portions of  the banking sector. 
Euro area Member States provided additional funds of  up to €100bn to back the bail 
outs,25 with an initial transfer of  €39.5bn from the European Stability Mechanism 
eb4abc5e4da5bbceb47d6c17141baba12a5. 
20 See e.g. Rachel Epstein and Martin Rhodes, “International in Life, National in Death? Banking Nationalism 
on the Road to the Banking Union”, Working Paper (April 2014): 9 14, accessed January 10, available at 
http://www.ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/ebcf60c9-0053-4f10-b60a-633a07c93e9e.pdf. 
21 European Banking Authority, The EBA Publishes Recommendation and Final Results of  Bank 
Recapitalisation Plan as Part of  Coordinated Measures to Restore Confidence in the Banking Sector, 
December 8 (2011), accessed January 10, available at http://www.eba.europa.eu/-/the-eba-publishes-
recommendation-and-final-results-of-bank-recapitalisation-plan-as-part-of-co-ordinated-measures-
to-restore-confidence-in-the-banking. 
22 Christopher Bjork and Jonathan House, “Spain Moves to Rescue Bankia”, WALL St. J. (Online) May 9 
(2012), accessed January 10, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023040703
04577394220289946192.html#; Tommy Stubbington and David Roman, “Bankia Bailout Hits Spanish 
Bonds”, WALL ST. J. (Online), May 28 (2012), accessed January 10, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052702303807404577431784097492256.html. 
23 For a comprehensive critical review of  these accounting practices, see Fiona Mann and Ian Michael, 
“Dynamic Provisioning: Issues and Applications”, Fin. Stability Rev. 128 (2002): 133, accessed January 10, 
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/fsr/2002/fsr13art6.
pdf.
24 For a detailed description of  the events at Bankia, see Hans Joachim Dübel, “The Capital Structure 
of  Banks and Practice of  Bank Restructuring”, Center for Fin. Stud., Working Paper nº. 04 (2013): 22 
31, accessed January 10, available at https://www.ifk-cfs.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/
wp/2013/CFS_WP_2013-4.pdf. 
25 Charles Forelle and Garbriele Steinhauser, “Latest Europe Rescue Aims to Prop up Spain”, WALL ST. 
J., June 11 (2012); Sara Schaeffer Muñoz, David Enrich and Christopher Bjork, “Madrid’s Handling of  
Bankia Repeats a Pattern of  Denial”, WALL ST. J., June 11 (2012). 
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(ESM)26 occurring in December 201227 and Spain’s successful exit from the assistance 
program without further sizeable transfers taking place in January 2014.28
In the end, the political will to initiate a banking union among the Euro area 
Member States at the end of  June 2012.29 Arose as the result of  politically induced 
lax governance and oversight,30 the repeated pattern of  insufficient and delayed 
information, and the evident moral hazard problems31 created by an irresponsible 
national banking sector that can rely on international aid.
3. The architecture of  the European Banking Union: an overview
A more centralized system of  financial supervision and resolution was, 
therefore, deemed necessary, as an outcome of  the described context and events, 
to restore credibility and stability to the Euro area banking system, and to break the 
referred doom loop between banks and sovereign states, and thereby to help address 
the fundamental problems of  the Euro area and the EU.32 As mentioned before, 
a supervisory development was pointed out as a necessary precondition for the 
unlocking of  the ESM funding for direct bank recapitalization.33 The EBU started 
to gain a concrete shape in the form of  the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), 
with the ECB as its hub. The legal framework for the establishment of  the SSM was 
agreed in September 2013 and entered into force on 30 October 2013.34 The ECB 
fully assumed its supervisory tasks in November 2014, subject to implementation 
26 The European Council first agreed on the need for euro area Member States to establish a stability 
mechanism of  a permanent nature in December 2010 (cf. Conclusions of  the European Council of  
16 and 17 of  December 2010, accessed January 10, 2018, available at https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/
conclusions_of_the_brussels_european_council_16_and_17_december_2010-en-4aaeea91-2e6b-
47dc-9d6b-a098c6567b6f.html. However, the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, 
comprising the details regarding the functioning of  the ESM, concluded exclusively by Eurozone 
Member States, only came into force on 27 September 2012 in its second version. In fact, a first version 
had been agreed upon in July 2011 but was further developed largely in result of  the deepening of  
the euro debt crisis. For further details on the ESM, set up as an international organisation located in 
Luxembourg, and the consolidated version of  the ESM Treaty cf. http://www.esm.europa.eu/index.
htm, accessed January 10, 2018. 
27 Art Patnaude, “ESM Issues Debt for Spanish Bank Recapitalization”, WALL ST. J. (Online), 
December 5 (2012), accessed January 10, 2018, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
24127887324640104578160753000745828.html#. 
28 European Commission, Post programme surveillance for Spain, accessed January 10, 2018, available 
at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-
financial-assistance/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-spain_en. 
29 Press Release, European Council, Euro Area Summit Statement, June 29 (2012), accessed January 
10, 2018, available at http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.
pdf.  
30 The Bankia Disaster, WALL ST. J. (Online), January 1 (2013), accessed January 10, 2018, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323320404578215392185006694.html.  
31 Goyal et al., 12; supra note 8. 
32 European Commission, A Roadmap Towards a Banking Union (COM(2012) 510); European 
Council.Conclusions (14/15 March 2013), para 13.
33 Euro Area Summit Statement, 29 June (2012). 
34 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of  15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of  credit institutions 
[2013] OJ L287/63 (SSM Regulation). Related changes were made to the legal framework for the 
European Banking Authority (EBA): Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of  22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [2013] OJ L287/5. 
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arrangements.35 A central part of  the preparatory work was comprised by the 
ECB’s “comprehensive review”, a health check of  significant banks’ balance sheets 
and risk profiles, that aimed to address legacy issues by outlining the transparency 
of  bank balance sheets, identifying, and implementing corrective action (such as 
recapitalization or bank closure), and rebuilding investor confidence lost prior to the 
ECB taking over its supervisory tasks.36 Any proposed corrective action that could 
involve State aid would require authorization from the Commission and would, 
therefore, be closely scrutinized in accordance with the Commission’s framework 
for support measures in favour of  banks.37 In parallel, the ESM was prepared for 
direct bank recapitalization in order to become operational at the time of  the SSM’s 
effectiveness.38
The other institutional elements of  the EBU are a single bank resolution 
mechanism (SRM), which includes a single bank resolution fund (SRF) alongside a 
common system for deposit protection, which is the most controversial component of  
the unfolding EBU.39 In July 2013 the Commission published proposals for the SRM 
to apply in the participating Member States,40 but the design of  the SRM developed 
significantly during an intensive legislative process, which was completed in 2014.41 
The SRM Regulation is complemented by an Intergovernmental Agreement between 
the Member States that participate in the EBU on the transfer and mutualisation of  
contributions into the SRF (SRF IGA).42
35 Which included: MoU between the Council and the ECB on practical aspects of  the exercise of  
democratic accountability of  the supervisory tasks of  the ECB vis-à-vis the Council (December 2013); 
Inter institutional Agreement covering practical aspects of  the exercise of  democratic accountability 
of  the supervisory tasks of  the ECB vis-à-vis the European Parliament (November 2013); Regulation 
(EU) No 468/2014 of  the European Central Bank of  16 April 2014 establishing the framework for 
cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and na-
tional competent authorities and with national designated authorities [2014] OJ L141/1 (SSM Frame-
work Regulation); Regulation (EU) No 469/2014 of  the European Central Bank of  16 April 2014 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2157/1999 on the powers of  the European Central Bank to impose 
sanctions (ECB/1999/4) [2014] OJ L141/51. 
36 ECB, Comprehensive Assessment (2014), accessed January 10, 2018, available at http://www.ecb.
europa.eu/ssm/assessment/html/index.en.html. 
37 SSM Regulation, Article 33(4); Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 
August 2013, of  State aid rules to support measures in favour of  banks in the context of  the financial 
crisis (“Banking Communication”) 2013/C 216/01 [2013] OJ C216/1. 
38 Statement by the President of  the Eurogroup on the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument, 10 
June 2014. The ESM DRI was to become operational when the 18 euro area MSs completed national 
procedures and the ESM Board had taken an unanimous decision to create a new instrument. 
39 The EU28 harmonized framework for deposit guarantee schemes was revamped: Directive 2014/49/
EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  16 April 2014 on Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
[2014] OJ L173/149. Changes include the introduction of  ex ante financing arrangements, borrowing 
between national schemes on a voluntary basis, and adjustments linked to the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive. 
40 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
for the resolution of  credit institutions and certain investment firms in the context of  a Single 
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 (COM(2013) 520). 
41 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of  15 July 2014 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council for 
the resolution of  credit institutions and certain investment firms in the context of  a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [2014] 
OJ L225/1 (SRM Regulation). 
42 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of  Contributions to the Single 
Resolution Fund (May 2014).  
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The pan EU so called single rulebook in banking – the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR), the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRDIV), the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the recast Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes Directive - provides the regulatory framework for the EBU.43 Although 
the denomination “single rulebook” is useful, it is not entirely accurate. There are 
implications for the EBU resulting from the retention of  national discretions in the 
banking rulebook. The EBU is set up, as we have seen, on the need for centralization 
of  responsibilities but it is heavily dependent on a rulebook that has been structured 
for a different objective, namely harmonization between the EU28, which allows 
for flexibility to accommodate certain national requirements.44 Conflict may occur 
between these two strategies.45
4. SSM: provisional remarks on an unfolding design
It was particularly challenging to conciliate the SSM with the existing Treaty 
framework, demanding exceptional political skills and an extremely pragmatic decision 
making process. The outcome was a complex structure with peculiar organizational 
features.46 There is a Single Supervisory Mechanism, not a Single Supervisory Authority 
or, in other words, responsibility for banking supervision within the participating 
Member States is not completely denationalized. In fact, there is a distribution of  day 
to day supervisory tasks for banks between the ECB and national authorities, although 
the ECB, overall, is in charge on the prudential side.
Given the terms of  Article 127(6) TFEU, post crisis learning favouring an 
objectives based supervisory structure and strong central bank involvement in 
prudential supervision is contingent on the EBU. However, not allowing the scope 
of  the SSM to extend to all the financial market actors that may require prudential 
oversight because of  their propensity to cause systemic harm47 constitutes a deficiency 
of  the existing Treaty framework. The SSM reflects, indeed, a traditional and narrow 
view of  the sources of  systemic risk but, despite the fact that the benefits of  a more 
elastic approach, such as the enhanced prudential regulatory frameworks of  the UK 
43 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  26 June 2013 
on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 [2013] OJ L176/1 (CRR); Directive 2013/36/EU of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of  26 June 2013 on access to the activity of  credit institutions and the prudential 
supervision of  credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L 176/338 (CRDIV); Directive 2014/59/EU 
of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of  credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directives 
77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 
2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L173/190 (BRRD); 
Directive 2014/49/EU (deposit guarantees). CRR/CRDIV constitute the improved EU prudential 
regulation framework, implementing the Basel III international standards. BRRD puts in place a 
(minimum) harmonization regulatory regime for intervention in banks under pressure and some 
other financial firms.  
44 E.g., CRR, Articles 7 10 and CRDIV, Articles 129 130; see further Andrea Enria, “The New Role of  the 
European Banking Authority in the Banking Union”, Speech, ESE Conference, Frankfurt (26 September 
2013). 
45 Andrea Enria, supra note 44. 
46 Eilís Ferran and Valia Babis, “The European Single Supervisory Mechanism”, Journal of  Corporate Law 
Studies, 13 (2013): 255 
47 For instance, the 2008 collapse of  AIG, a multinational insurance company, was a systemic event.
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and the US, would be better, this imperfection does not preclude, by itself, the overall 
developments of  the design.
The same can be said regarding the ECB’s organizational, governance and 
accountability arrangements.48 One of  the standard arguments against central bank 
involvement in supervision is the risk of  conflicts of  interest between monetary 
and supervisory policy functions. However, synergistic advantages going the other 
way can also be identified. In the absence of  a winning argument, the focus shifts 
to ensuring that such conflicts of  interest as may arise when the functions are 
combined in a single organization are managed by appropriate internal governance 
arrangements. The fact that the current ECB Treaty framework is not ideally designed 
to set up internal safeguards to prevent cross contamination is not debated49 but, a 
lot has been put in place to strengthen its structure.50 The position of  participating 
Member States that are not part of  the Euro area is also not satisfactory51 but, the 
“close cooperation” arrangement mechanism, set up by an ECB decision with a two way 
mechanism for termination, and the procedure for a non-Euro Member State to 
decide not to be bound by a decision of  the ECB Governing Council, are reasonable 
compromises, taking into account the limitations of  the available legal space.52
The position regarding the distribution of  competences between the ECB and 
the national competent authorities (NCAs) requires a more in depth analysis and, 
as an introduction, the complicated nature of  this arrangement needs to be briefly 
explained.53 Under Articles 4 and 6 of  the SSM Regulations, the ECB has exclusive 
competence within a predetermined framework to carry out a specified list of  tasks 
for prudential supervisory purposes in relation to all banks established in participating 
Member States.54 Tasks not specifically conferred on the ECB remain with NCAs.55 
There is a wide range of  issues that have both prudential and conduct of  business 
dimensions and that, therefore, potentially require ECB NCA cooperation.
Regarding exclusive competences of  the ECB from the list of  prudential tasks 
under Article 4, the ECB is responsible, regardless of  the size or systemic significance 
of  the institution, for the granting and withdrawal of  banking licences, and for 
assessing the suitability of  bank owners.56 Regarding the remaining prudential tasks 
enumerated in the list, for which the ECB has exclusive competence under Article 
4, broadly speaking, the Article 6 framework gives the ECB the responsibility for 
carrying out those tasks in relation to more significant banks. Differently, for less 
significant banks, the NCAs have primary responsibility.57 While those will continue 
to be prudentially supervised on a day to day basis by NCAs, the ECB retains the 
general oversight of  the system, as well as certain specific powers, including a power 
to take an institution into direct supervision when it considers this to be necessary to 
48 SSM Regulation, Recitals 54 76, and Articles 19 33. 
49 The fact that the position could be further improved is acknowledged in SSM Regulation, Recital 85. 
50 In particular SSM Regulation, Article 25 (requirement for separation of  functions) and Article 26 
(the supervisory board). 
51 Acknowledged in SSM Regulation, Recital 85. 
52 SSM Regulation, Article 7 and Article 26. See further Eilís Ferran, “European Banking Union and the 
EU Single Financial Market: more differentiated integration, or disintegration?”, Legal Studies Research Paper, 
nº. 29, University of  Cambridge - Faculty of  Law, (2014). 
53 For a more comprehensive analysis, see Ferran et al., supra note 46. 
54 SSM Regulation, Article 4. 
55 SSM Regulation, Recital 28 and Article 1. 
56 SSM Regulation, Article 4(1)(a) and (c) and Article 6(4). 
57 SSM Regulation, Article 6. 
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ensure the consistent application of  high supervisory standards.58
Particularly relevant is the fact that the application of  capital buffers and other 
macro prudential tools are not tasks conferred to the ECB.59 However, the ECB 
may apply, if  necessary, more demanding measures than those applied by national 
authorities.60
Macro prudential regulation and its respective instruments came to the fore 
in financial regulation as an outcome of  the global financial crisis. One of  the 
shortcomings of  the previous system was that it was too focused on the soundness 
of  individual institutions, not paying sufficient attention to risks resulting from 
the intertwining of  the system, as a whole. The answer is now comprised of  
macroprudential tools, such as countercyclical capital and systemic risk buffers.61
These multi layered assortments of  prudential responsibilities between the 
ECB and NCAs was set up during the legislative process, where intense political 
discussions ended up producing a complex legal text which may result in legal 
uncertainties. 
Furthermore, the final position that has been adopted within the SSM could be 
perceived as the product of  national efforts to resist interference with the status quo 
of  close relationships between financial and political players at the local level. The 
complexity topic is controversial: on the one hand, complex rules can be criticised for 
originating opacity, uncertainty, and huge compliance costs;62 on the other, activities 
as sophisticated and powerful as modern financial markets may require a flexible 
regulatory response that only a complex control system has the resilience to deliver. 
Supervisory design mirrors these arguments. A “simple” system of  supervision is 
the integrated or single supervisor model, which used to have overwhelming support 
for being better suited for fragmented approaches in terms of  clarity of  purpose, 
comprehensiveness, scale and scope efficiencies, and accountability. But the post 
crisis experienced undermined this position, shedding light to the fact that prudential 
supervision is a specialized function in which central banks should play a prominent 
role.63 The central question is whether the SSM is at risk of  being compromised by 
the division of  competences between the ECB and the NCAs, therefore becoming 
utterly ineffective. 
5. Final remarks
The SSM assessment that we have briefly carried out does not bring to light 
clear evidence of  its likely mid or long term failure. The fortuitous presence of  
Article 127(6) TFEU which added to the re calibration of  the benefits of  central 
bank involvement in prudential supervision, has paved the way for a supervisory 
framework that has certain oddities and potential weaknesses, but which does 
not look fatally flawed from the outset. However, it is of  the utmost importance 
to underline the need for an effective coordination and alignment between bank 
58 SSM Regulation, Article 6. 
59 SSM Regulation, Article 5. 
60 SSM Regulation, Article 5(2). 
61 See further CRDIV, Articles 128 140. 
62 AG Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee”, speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City’s 
36th economic policy symposium, 31 August (2012).  
63 Donato Masciandaro, “Back to the Future”, European Company & Financial Law Review, 9 (2012): 
112. 
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regulation and supervision, and particularly to the necessary support of  a resolution 
framework that enables banks and other systemically significant institutions to fail 
without systemic disruption.
It suffices to recall the EBA’s unfortunate experience with bank stress tests, 
which are meant to test the resilience of  European banks in adverse scenarios, but 
that have historically struggled to come across as credible enough because of  apparent 
insufficient rigor in the stress predicaments. Off  course, fear of  uncontrolled 
failure constitutes a consistent explanation factor underlying the hesitancy of  
the EBA’s behaviour. The same problem could easily affect the ECB without the 
abovementioned robust institutional set up that provides for safe and efficient bank 
failure within the EBU. Therefore, the long term solidity of  the EBU will most likely 
lie in the successful interconnectivity between the SSM and the SRM.
